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INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the most visible law that 
protects private employees from discrimination based on sex.1  Remedial 
statutes must be construed broadly,2 yet it is not clear how broadly “sex” is 
defined under the statute.3  Everyone agrees that Title VII at the very least 
protects women from discrimination because they are women and protects 
men from discrimination because they are men.4  But what of the intersex 
people in the United States whose genetic and biological characteristics do 
not place them neatly into one of the two common biological sexes?  Are 
they protected from sex discrimination by Title VII5 or by state antidiscri-
mination laws that prohibit discrimination “based on . . . sex”?6 
Popular culture and current events have periodically piqued public in-
terest in the intersex community.7  In the middle of 2009, Caster Semenya, 
an eighteen-year-old world champion runner from South Africa, captured 
international attention at the World Athletic Championships in Berlin.8  She 
 
1  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employ-
er . . .  to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .”).  Many states also have similar statutes that 
protect other categories.  See, e.g., California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 12940(a) (West Supp. 2011) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation); Il-
linois Human Rights Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102(A) (West Supp. 2010) (protecting sexual 
orientation and gender identity). 
2  See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“[W]e are guided by the familiar canon 
of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purpos-
es.”). 
3  The case law, for example, distinguishes sex from sexual orientation, but it does not distinguish 
sex from gendered behavior.  This can lead to absurd results.  Heterosexual women can be protected 
when discriminated against for being insufficiently feminine, see, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989), but this theory may be unavailable to nonheterosexuals if the discrimination 
was also motivated by anti-gay animus, see, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217–18 
(2d Cir. 2005). 
4  See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Wood v. C.G. Studios, 
Inc., 660 F. Supp. 176, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
5  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
6  E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102(A); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4112.02(A) (West Supp. 2010). 
7  For example, in 2003, Jeffrey Eugenides won the Pulitzer Prize for his novel Middlesex.  Michelle 
Pauli, Middlesex Bags Pulitzer Prize for Fiction, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Apr. 8, 2003, 11:18 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2003/apr/08/news.pulitzerprize.  Middlesex is a multigenerational sto-
ry whose narrator has 5-alpha-reductase deficiency and grew up as a girl before adopting a male gender 
identity at puberty.  JEFFREY EUGENIDES, MIDDLESEX (2002).  The 2007 Argentinian film XXY tells a 
coming-of-age story about an intersex teenager.  XXY (Historias Cinematograficas 2007); see also Re-
becca Leffler, Critics Week Grand Prize to ‘XXY,’ HOLLYWOODREPORTER.COM (May 26, 2007), avail-
able at http://web.archive.org/web/20070930222336/http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/content_display/
awards_festivals/cannes/news/e3id97fddd8a9cc782ed64893105887c4fc (reporting that XXY won the Inter-
national Critics Week Grand Prize at the Cannes International Critics Week). 
8  Report: Running Champ a ‘Hermaphrodite,’ CBS NEWS (Sept. 10, 2009, 12:52 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/10/sportsline/main5301221.shtml. 
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shattered the previous world record for the 800-meter dash by almost two 
and a half seconds,9 and officials ordered medical tests to clear suspicions 
of foul play over Semenya’s dramatic performance.10  The results were un-
expected: they indicated that Semenya was an intersex individual.11  The 
story captured media interest and began broad speculation about the proper 
role of gender in sports.12 
Semenya’s was not the first story to raise international eyebrows about 
ambiguous biological sex in sports.13  In 1977, Dr. Renee Richards, who 
was transsexual, sued the United States Tennis Association and eventually 
vindicated her right to compete in the women’s competition of the U.S. 
Open, even though she did not have the “female” karyotype14 she needed to 
pass the sex chromosome test.15  To avoid the media attention and possible 
injustice at the Olympics in Athens, the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) agreed in 2004 to end sex testing for athletes.16 
Some members of the legal community then began to wonder what 
would have happened if Semenya had been an American employee instead 
of a South African athlete.17  Do our statutes that prohibit sex discrimination 
protect the intersex?  The answer, according to Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc., 
 
9  Id. 
10  Stewart MacLean, Is She Really a HE? Women’s 800m Runner Shrugs off Gender Storm to Take 
Gold, DAILYMAIL.CO.UK (Aug. 19, 2001, 1:32 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/
article-1207653. 
11  Report: Running Champ a ‘Hermaphrodite,’ supra note 8. 
12  See, e.g., Tim Dahlberg, The Shameful Case of Caster Semenya, FOX NEWS (Nov. 21, 2009), 
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2009Nov21/0,4675,ATHTimDahlberg112109,00.html; 
Semenya Tests ‘Must Be Annulled,’ BBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2009, 1:10 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/8333840.stm.  
13  In fact, her story is far less unusual than one might think.  Dr. Arne Ljungqvist, chair of the Inter-
national Olympic Committee’s medical committee, noted that in 1996, before the IOC stopped sex 
chromatin testing, eight of the 3387 female athletes they tested were found to have disorders of sexual 
development.  Gina Kolata, Gender Testing Hangs Before the Games as a Muddled and Vexing Mess, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2010, at D2. 
14  A person’s karyotype shows the number and appearance of her chromosomes, including the X 
and Y chromosomes associated with biological sex.  See Talking Glossary: “Karyotype,” NAT’L HUM. 
GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/glossary/?id=114 (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) (describing 
the karyotyping processes and the medical information they can reveal). 
15  Julie Shapiro, Check Only One: M/F/Other, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 587, 587 n.3 (2005); 
Neil Amdur, Renee Richards Ruled Eligible for U.S. Open, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1977, at B7.  Tennis 
legend Billie Jean King filed an affidavit in support of Dr. Richards’s right to compete as a woman.  
Neil Amdur, Dr. Richards Gets Support of Mrs. King, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1977, at D13. 
16  IOC Approves Consensus with Regard to Athletes Who Have Changed Sex, OLYMPIC.ORG (May 
17, 2004), http://www.olympic.org/media?articleid=56230. 
17  E.g., Bennett Capers, The Meaning of Y, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 24, 2009, 7:32 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/08/the-meaning-of-y.html; Daniel Schwartz, The Cu-
rious Case of Caster Semenya—What Would an Employer Do?, CONN. EMP. L. BLOG (Sept. 11, 2009), 
http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2009/09/articles/hr-issues/the-curious-case-of-caster-semenya-
what-would-an-employer-do. 
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is no.18  As a matter of statutory interpretation, the court held that discrimi-
nation against the intersex is not discrimination based on sex.19  Decided by 
the federal district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1987, 
Wood is the only reported authority on this question. 
Much has changed in the law since the Wood decision was handed 
down, however, and it can no longer be considered good law.  In Price Wa-
terhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff had stated a va-
lid cause of action when she alleged that her nonconformance to gender 
stereotypes resulted in adverse outcomes.20  Thus, a wealth of case law now 
supports protection from discrimination based on gender nonconformity.21  
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court rea-
soned that Title VII prohibits all discrimination based on sex, even if Con-
gress had not considered certain forms of sex discrimination when it passed 
the Civil Rights Act.22 
Some courts, though, have been reluctant to extend the reasoning in 
Price Waterhouse and Oncale to protect transsexuals and other sexual mi-
norities.23  They fear that plaintiffs will use the protections from gender-
nonconformity cases to “bootstrap” new protections into the statute, espe-
cially protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation or 
gender identity.24  As such, those jurisdictions are left with what I refer to as 
“Goldilocks case law.”  First, the Price Waterhouse porridge is too cold for 
a person whose mannerisms or behavior conform to gender expectations; a 
plaintiff cannot show that she suffered discrimination based on gender non-
conformity if she conforms to expectations of her gender.  Conversely, 
Wood makes the porridge too hot for a person whose manner diverges 
widely from social expectations; a transgender person has no cause of ac-
 
18  660 F. Supp. 176, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
19  Id. 
20  490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
21  Although the Supreme Court does not distinguish between sex and gender in its opinions, to keep 
my terminology in line with the distinction between sex and gender, I use the term “gender nonconfor-
mity” to describe what others may call “sex stereotyping.” 
22  523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover rea-
sonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal con-
cerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”). 
23  See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth. (Etsitty II), 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007) (declin-
ing to hold that discrimination against transsexuals is prohibited by Title VII); Dawson v. Bumble & 
Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217–18 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that Title VII does not protect the gay plaintiff 
because sexual orientation is not sex); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1086 (7th Cir. 
2000) (“Title VII . . . does not prohibit harassment in general or of one’s homosexuality in particular.”); 
see also Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Title VII does not 
protect transsexuals because, according to the court, discrimination on the basis of having a “sexual 
identity disorder” is not discrimination on the basis of sex). 
24  See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Appellants now 
ask us to employ the disproportionate impact decisions as an artifice to ‘bootstrap’ Title VII protection 
for homosexuals under the guise of protecting men generally.”). 
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tion.  Thus, only the middle is “just right”—individuals whose gender per-
formance diverges just slightly from the gender norm (but not too much!)25 
comprise the only protected class. 
There is ample room to criticize the policy wisdom, logical coherence, 
and line-drawing problems of this case law.26  Even under the case law’s 
Goldilocks logic, though, Title VII protects the intersex from employment 
discrimination.  Because anatomy is as much a part of human sex as is the 
social performance of gender roles, the intersex occupy the “just right” 
middle ground of a Goldilocks spectrum of anatomical sex nonconformity.  
An individual whose anatomy matches her apparent gender is not legally 
harmed by the expectation that her gender and anatomy match.  At the other 
end of the spectrum, an individual whose anatomy and gender are complete-
ly at odds—a transsexual person—is unprotected for fear of “bootstrap-
ping.” 
This Comment argues that the law, when properly construed, provides 
employment protections for intersex persons whose anatomy occupies the 
middle ground, differing only somewhat from the anatomy expected to ac-
company their gender.  Just as the law protects individuals whose gender 
expression does not conform to the behaviors that society expects of per-
sons of their biological sex, it also protects those whose sexual anatomy 
does not conform to what society expects of persons of their gender.  The 
reasoning behind Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc.27 is out of touch with the cur-
rent law and is ripe for challenge.  Part I of this Comment contains a quick 
background on sexual minorities, details the range of people who are classi-
fied as intersex, and discusses some of the legal and social challenges they 
face.  Part II shows how the United States came to have its current Goldi-
locks case law on gender nonconformity and protections for sexual minori-
ties.  Part III argues that the most sensible interpretation of Title VII 
discrimination “because of . . . sex” includes discrimination because of in-
tersex status. 
 
25  I do not mean to imply as a theoretical matter that gender expression is a mere spectrum from 
“female behavior” to “male behavior”; there are countless ways to differ from some behavioral expecta-
tions.  Think of it, instead, as a spectrum between “gender conforming in every way” to “gender con-
forming in no way whatsoever.” 
26  Such a critique is, however, beyond the scope of this Comment.  For example, though, pleading 
legitimate gender-nonconformity claims becomes difficult for a transgender plaintiff.  See Schroer v. 
Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 2008) (“What makes [the transgender plaintiff’s] sex ste-
reotyping theory difficult is that, when the plaintiff is transsexual, direct evidence of discrimination 
based on sex stereotypes may look a great deal like discrimination based on transsexuality itself . . . .”).  
For a discussion of how the judicial process forces gay, lesbian, and transgender plaintiffs into a difficult 
situation in drafting their pleadings, see Joel Wm. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled 
Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 205, 218–20 (2007). 
27  660 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1286 
I. WHO ARE THE INTERSEX? 
Intersex people have a condition that causes their biological sex traits 
to be ambiguous or mismatched, what doctors call a difference, or some-
times disorder, of sexual development (DSD).28  Yet they all inhabit a 
common middle ground within the social understanding of sex.  In section 
A, I describe the common distinction between biological sex and cultural 
gender and how that distinction is useful for classifying sexual minorities 
but misleading because it is tempting to analogize it to the distinction be-
tween nature and nurture.  In section B, I go over what it means to be inter-
sex, the challenges and experiences intersex people share, and how their 
interests differ from those of other sexual minorities. 
A. Sex Is Not Gender 
It has become an academic norm to use the term “sex” to refer to go-
nadal, chromosomal, or genital anatomy and to use the term “gender” to re-
fer to the socially expected behaviors and preferences commonly ascribed 
to each sex.29  For example, testicles, testosterone, and XY sex chromo-
somes are part of a person’s sex.  Her preference for wearing dresses, play-
ing with dolls, adopting a caregiver role, or performing nonaggressive 
mannerisms, as well as an inborn sense of being female, are all parts of that 
person’s gender.  As the saying goes, “[S]ex is between your legs; gender is 
between your ears.”30  A person’s physiological sex is thus differentiated 
from her gender, which instead refers to the “internal, deeply felt sense of 
being either male or female, or something other or in between.”31 
The distinction between sex and gender is not currently part of Ameri-
can employment law.32  Although courts use the two terms interchangeably 
 
28  7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1138 (2d ed. 1989) (defining the word “intersex” as a biologi-
cal term denoting, “[i]n a diœcious species, an abnormal form or individual having characteristics of 
both sexes[ or] the condition of being of this type”); see also Thomas F. Kolon, Disorders of Sex Devel-
opment, in FUNDAMENTALS OF PEDIATRIC SURGERY 693, 693, 699 (Peter Mattei ed., 2011) (noting that, 
at least in medical literature, the term “intersex” has been replaced by “DSD”). 
29  See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effemi-
nate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10–11 (1995); Jayde Pryzgoda & 
Joan C. Chrisler, Definitions of Gender and Sex: The Subtleties of Meaning, 43 SEX ROLES 553, 554 
(2000). 
30  The origins of this bon mot are unclear, but it occurs quite often in discussions of gender and sex-
ual diversity, from sensitivity training to academic papers and prime-time television.  See, e.g., Jillian 
Todd Weiss, Transgender Identity, Textualism, and the Supreme Court: What is the “Plain Meaning” of 
“Sex” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 573, 615 & n.250 
(2009); Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast Aug. 10, 2007) (transcript at http://transcripts.cnn.
com/TRANSCRIPTS/0708/10/lkl.01.html). 
31  Jamison Green, Introduction to PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, TRANSGENDER 
EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 1, 3 (2000), available at http://www.
thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/TransgenderEquality.pdf. 
32  Some scholars have proposed that, in practice, any policy that discriminates impermissibly on sex 
is actually based on assumptions based on gender.  See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex 
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in Title VII jurisprudence,33 I differentiate them in this Comment to simplify 
the discussion of the diversity of sexual minorities.  Interestingly, the per-
son most responsible for this synonymity is Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  
When she was the premier litigator of sex discrimination cases, Justice 
Ginsburg chose to use the phrase “gender discrimination” to avoid the pru-
rient associations of the word “sex.”34 
The usage distinction between sex and gender began in the mid-
twentieth century and has grown in popularity.  When it first appeared in 
English, “gender” referred only to the linguistic feature of nouns and pro-
nouns familiar to students of most European languages.35  After five dec-
ades in use as a social classification,36 though, the distinction between 
gender and sex is now well established.  The Oxford English Dictionary 
now defines sex and gender differently—sex is biological and gender is so-
cial37—and the American Heritage Dictionary includes a usage note distin-
guishing between biological sex and social gender.38 
 
Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 36–40 (1995) (ar-
guing that, in sexual discrimination laws, biology and genitals act as false proxies for gender attribu-
tion); Ilona M. Turner, Comment, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 
CALIF. L. REV. 561, 563–65 (2007) (“[A]ll ‘sex’ discrimination is really ‘gender’ discrimination.”).  See 
generally JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER (1993) (arguing that it is culture and the act of per-
forming gender that makes sex have meaning). 
33  See, e.g., Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 n.1 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]here is no 
need to distinguish between the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ in Title VII cases.  Consequently, courts, 
speaking in the context of Title VII, have used the term[s] ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ interchangeably to refer 
simply to the fact that an employee is male or female. . . .  While it may be useful to disaggregate the 
definition of ‘gender’ from ‘sex’ for some purposes, in this opinion we make no such effort . . . .”).  But 
see, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The word 
‘gender’ has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as op-
posed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes.  That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is 
to female and masculine to male.”). 
34  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 1 n.1.  She later told an audience at Columbia University that she made that choice because of a 
secretary who noted: 
I’m typing all these briefs and articles for you and the word sex, sex, sex is on every page. . . .   
Don’t you know that those nine men . . . hear that word and their first association is not the way 
you want them to be thinking?  Why don’t you use the word gender?  It is a grammatical term and 
it will ward off distracting associations. 
Catherine Crocker, Ginsburg Explains Origin of Sex, Gender, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at A28 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted), available at http://articles.latimes.com/1993-11-21/news/mn-
59217_1_supreme-court. 
35  6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 28, at 428.  Weiss, supra note 30, at 605, 608. 
36  The first person to use the term to distinguish biological sex from social cues was John Money, a 
sex researcher at John Hopkins University, writing in 1955.  Weiss, supra note 30, at 605. 
37  Compare 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 28, at 428 (defining the word “gender” as 
“a euphemism for the sex of a human being, often intended to emphasize the social and cultural, as op-
posed to the biological, distinctions between the sexes”), with 15 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra 
note 28, at 107–08 (defining the word “sex” as “[t]he distinction between male and female in general.  In 
recent use often with more explicit notion: The sum of the differences in the structure and function of 
the reproductive organs on the ground of which beings are distinguished as male and female, and of the 
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There are many ways to characterize a person within the categories of 
gender and sex.  Gender expectations have changed over time, and they dif-
fer among cultures.39  Likewise, different tests have been used in different 
contexts for classifying individuals by biological sex.  The most common 
and legally significant of these tests is the appearance of external genitalia 
at birth, which most often determines the sex marked on the newborn’s 
birth certificate.40  Even so, many DSDs result in children being born with 
ambiguous or misleading external genitalia, leaving a “glance between the 
legs” check inconclusive.41  Even chromosome tests, which have been used 
in some sporting competitions to assure that men were not competing as 
women,42 have blind spots.43  Maria Patiño, a Spanish hurdler, was disquali-
fied from the 1985 World University Games after failing a sex chromatin 
test.44  Patiño had had no reason to suspect she would fail the test; her geni-
talia, appearance, and self-identity had always seemed to be that of a normal 
female.45  What she did not know was that she had congenital androgen in-
sensitivity syndrome—a condition that may actually have put her at a com-
petitive disadvantage because of her inability to process testosterone.46  
 
other physiological differences consequent on these; the class of phenomena with which these differenc-
es are concerned”). 
38  AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 731 (4th ed. 2000) (giving usage note differentiating the 
terms “sex” and “gender”); see also Weiss, supra note 30, at 608 & n.226. 
39  See YORK W. BRADSHAW, JOSEPH F. HEALEY & REBECCA SMITH, SOCIOLOGY FOR A NEW 
CENTURY 243–51 (2001) (describing how social roles based on sex differ between societies and how 
expectations for men and women have changed even within the twentieth century). 
40  Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law 
and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 271 (1999). 
41  Genetically male children born with 5-alpha-reductase deficiency, a DSD that inhibits the body’s 
ability to process testosterone before puberty, can appear female at a cursory glance but develop a more 
male sexual anatomy at puberty.  Id. at 287–88; see also EUGENIDES, supra note 7 (fictional work whose 
protagonist has 5-alpha-reductase deficiency, is raised as a girl until puberty, and lives thereafter as a 
man). 
42  Kolata, supra note 13 (discussing chromosome testing in the Olympics in the context of the Se-
menya controversy); Joe Leigh Simpson et al., Gender Verification in the Olympics, 284 JAMA 1568, 
1569 (2000) (noting that the goal of gender testing Olympic athletes was not to differentiate between 
sexes or to detect male pseudo-hermaphrodites but to “prevent male imposters from participating in fe-
male competitions” (quoting Arne Ljungqvist, Women in Sport, in 8 OLYMPIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 183, 
183–93 (BL Drinkwater ed., 2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
43  Conditions like congenital androgen insensitivity syndrome can cause a person with a 46,XY ka-
ryotype, that of a typical male, to develop many typically female sex characteristics.  See Greenberg, 
supra note 40, at 286–87.  Because fetal sexual development is governed by the presence or absence of 
male hormones, an individual with an androgen insensitivity (i.e., one whose body does not process tes-
tosterone normally) can develop a female phenotype.  Id. at 279–81. 
44  Id. at 273. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
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Even so, her male karyotype disqualified her from participating in the 
women’s competition.47 
When determining a child’s sex, physicians sometimes rely on assump-
tions about “proper” sexual function.  When an ambiguously sexed new-
born’s phallus is found to be “inadequate” or its clitoris “too large,” doctors 
may call the child a female and surgically reduce the size of the organ: a 
genetic male undergoes surgery and is assigned a female sex if its phallus is 
“inadequate,” and a genetic female with a “too large” clitoris undergoes 
surgery and is assigned female if it is likely to be able to reproduce.48  In 
this context, maleness is defined by the size of the child’s phallus (and thus 
its future ability to penetrate a sexual partner), and femaleness by the 
child’s future ability to bear children.49  This functional test of biological 
sex relies on societal preconceptions of proper sexual relations and places a 
higher value on the size of a phallus than an individual’s sexual enjoyment 
or humanity’s natural sexual diversity.50 
In light of the clear shortcomings of any one test for determining sex, 
medical professionals have identified a number of biological characteristics 
that are indicative of sex.51  Although some factors could be subdivided into 
further factors, typical criteria include: 
• Genetic or chromosomal sex—XY or XX; 
• Gonadal sex (reproductive sex glands)—testes or ovaries; 
• Internal morphologic sex (determined after three months’ gesta-
tion)—seminal vesicles/prostate or vagina/uterus/fallopian tubes; 
• External morphologic sex (genitalia)—penis/scrotum or clito-
ris/labia; 
• Hormonal sex—androgens or estrogens; 
• Phenotypic sex (secondary sexual features)—facial and chest hair or 
breasts; 
• Assigned sex and gender of rearing; and 
• Sexual identity.52 
Many of these signals have a great deal of ambiguity.53  Some of these sig-
nals that define biological sex are plainly cultural, like “gender of rearing” 
 
47  Id. 
48  Julie A. Greenberg, Intersex and Intrasex Debates: Building Alliances to Challenge Sex Discrim-
ination, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 99, 104–05 (2005).  Genetic males who undergo such procedures 
can permanently lose the ability to procreate or experience sexual pleasure.  Genetic females can lose 
their ability to experience sexual pleasure, although their ability to reproduce is given greater value than 
the integrity or appearance of their genitalia.  Id.; see also Greenberg, supra note 40, at 271–72. 
49  Greenberg, supra note 40, at 272; Greenberg, supra note 48, at 105. 
50  Greenberg, supra note 40, at 272. 
51  Id. at 278. 
52  Id. (citing JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES: A GUIDE TO 
COUNSELING CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS, AND THEIR FAMILIES 4 (2d ed. 1994)). 
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and “sexual identity.”  And although for most people these eight factors 
align with each other, for many people the eight signals are not congruent. 
Although most of these tests for sex are determined by one’s biology 
and the gender roles assigned to each sex are essentially sociological, the 
disaggregation of sex from gender should not be associated with popular 
nature versus nurture debates.  Although many people may be tempted to 
think of sex as nature and gender as nurture, there are many ways in which 
sex is not determined by nature or gender by nurture.54  The experiences of 
transsexual and transgender people provide compelling evidence that gend-
er identity is as biologically deep-seated as sexual identity.55  As one fam-
ous case demonstrates, early association of gender with nurture can lead to 
tragic results.  In 1965, David Reimer and his identical twin brother were 
both circumcised at around eight months of age, but David’s circumcision 
went awry.  The doctor burned off almost all of David’s penis.56  On the ad-
vice of Dr. John Money, a nationally renowned sex researcher, David un-
derwent genital reassignment surgeries before the age of two, and he was 
raised after that point as a girl under the name Brenda.57  For many years, 
Dr. Money reported that David (known as “Joan/John” in medical litera-
ture) was living as a happy little girl with a suitably feminine gender identi-
ty.58  But this was not the case.  David later reported that he had never felt 
comfortable as a girl, and he dreaded the repeated trips to visit Dr. Money 
 
53  For example, chromosome tests do not support a binary definition of sex: some people can be 
born with only one X chromosome.  Id. at 284.  Ambiguities also occur in external morphology, id. at 
285–86, and some people’s hormone levels inhabit an ambiguous range somewhere between male and 
female norms, id. at 286–89. 
54  Some writers conclude that because we attach meaning to only some differences in biology, sex 
is as much of a social construct as gender.  See Noa Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A Strug-
gle for Intersex and Transsex Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 51, 53 (2006) (noting that sex, like 
gender, is a “human-made process”). 
55  Krystal Etsitty, for instance, explained in her employment discrimination lawsuit that from the 
time she was a child she felt that she was a girl, and she always believed she had been born with the 
wrong sex organs.  Etsitty II, 502 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007).  Recent neuroscience studies have 
also hinted at a biological basis for one’s sexual identity separate from indicators for sexual orientation 
and indicia of biological sex.  See, e.g., Alicia Garcia-Falgueras & Dick F. Swaab, A Sex Difference in 
the Hypothalamic Uncinate Nucleus: Relationship to Gender Identity, 131 BRAIN 3132, 3141–46 
(2008); Frank P.M. Kruijver et al., Male-to-Female Transsexuals Have Female Neuron Numbers in a 
Limbic Nucleus, 85 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 2034, 2037–41 (2000); Eileen Lud-
ers et al., Regional Gray Matter Variation in Male-to-Female Transsexualism, 46 NEUROIMAGE 904, 
905–07 (2009). 
56  John Colapinto, The True Story of John/Joan, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 11, 1997, at 54, 58 (noting 
also that the burn was caused by the malfunction or misuse of an electrocautery needle, a heated device 
used in surgeries to cauterize blood vessels as it cuts); Who Was David Reimer (Also, Sadly, Known as 
“John/Joan”)?, INTERSEX SOC’Y N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/reimer (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) [he-
reinafter David Reimer]. 
57  Colapinto, supra note 56, at 64; David Reimer, supra note 56. 
58  Colapinto, supra note 56, at 70; David Reimer, supra note 56. 
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in Baltimore.59  When he was twelve, he convinced his parents to stop tak-
ing him to see Dr. Money.60  Nearly two years later, when David was almost 
fifteen, he was finally told of the botched circumcision and his biological 
sex at birth.61  David reassumed a male gender identity, which he main-
tained for the rest of his life.62  But even though he was happier living as a 
man, David still suffered from depression, and social anxieties contributed 
to two suicide attempts early in his twenties.63  He eventually married and 
adopted three children with his wife, but he continued to suffer psychologi-
cally and committed suicide in 2004 at the age of thirty-eight.64  David is 
gone, but his story stands as a warning of the tragedies that can result when 
social actors conflate gender with nurture. 
B. The Intersex and the Challenges They Face 
Intersex people are a diverse group, but they share one of any number 
of congenital conditions that result in conflicting or ambiguous indicia of 
biological sex.  Estimates vary, but approximately one out of every 1500 to 
2000 people is born with an intersex condition.65  Such an estimate is diffi-
cult to nail down because of discrepancies over what conditions the re-
searchers call “intersex.”66  Nevertheless, this statistic suggests that intersex 
conditions as a whole are about as common as cystic fibrosis and Down’s 
Syndrome.67 
Intersex people are one part of a larger class of sexual minorities, but 
being intersex is unrelated to one’s gender identity or sexual orientation.  
Indeed, the majority of intersex people are “cisgender,”68 meaning that they 
 
59  Colapinto, supra note 56, at 70–71. 
60  Id. at 71. 
61  Colapinto, supra note 56, at 92; David Reimer, supra note 56. 
62  Colapinto, supra note 56, at 92; David Reimer, supra note 56. 
63  See Colapinto, supra note 56, at 92; John Colapinto, Gender Gap: What Were the Real Reasons 
Behind David Reimer’s Suicide?, SLATE (June 3, 2004, 3:58 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2101678. 
64  Colapinto, supra note 63. 
65  Chai R. Feldblum, The Right to Define One’s Own Concept of Existence: What Lawrence Can 
Mean for Intersex and Transgender People, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 115, 131 (2006).  Based on this ra-
tio, one can estimate that there are around 200,000 intersex people living in the United States.  But see 
P.-L. Chau & Jonathan Herring, Defining, Assigning and Designing Sex, 16 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 
327, 332–33 (2002) (citing various estimates of intersex birth rates, including estimates of 17 per 1000 
(1.7%), 1 per 1500 (0.07%), and 4%); Greenberg, supra note 40, at 267 & n.7 (noting that some esti-
mates go as high as 4% of the population, which would mean there are over ten million intersex people 
living in the United States). 
66  How Common Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency (last vi-
sited Oct. 2, 2011). 
67  Greenberg, supra note 40, at 267 n.7. 
68  Intersex people are distinct from transsexual and transgender people.  The prefix “trans” refers to 
persons whose sexual or gender identity is the “opposite” of their assigned gender or sex.  The prefix 
“inter” refers to persons whose sexual or gender identity is somewhere between two extremes.  These 
two prefixes are attached to the terms “gender” and “sexual” to describe the ways in which sexual mi-
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present and act as society expects them to.69  For example, Caster Semenya, 
the champion runner from South Africa,70 identifies herself as a woman and 
maintains a feminine appearance and identity.71  In spite of her self-identity 
as a woman, some academics and activists consider her transgender; these 
individuals include the intersex under the label “transgender,” defining the 
term to refer to all people whose gender expression does not completely 
comport with society’s expectations for them based on their biological 
sex.72  This categorization troubles many intersex activists because the in-
terests of transgender and intersex people are not always aligned.73 
Intersex people can face a number of challenges in their lifetimes, es-
pecially in their interactions with medical care providers.  Intersex children 
are often forced to undergo several genital surgeries during their developing 
years.74  They can be left with permanent physical and psychological scars 
from the experience of having their genitals repeatedly examined by doctors 
and medical students.75  Some intersex people live for decades without be-
 
norities differ from the expected norms.  The prefix “cis” is the analogous counterpart that refers to per-
sons whose sexual or gender identity is in line with their assigned gender or sex.  For example, a person 
whose gender expression is feminine when society expects masculine expression is transgender, and a 
person whose female sexual identity is in harmony with the signifiers of biological sex is cisgender.  See 
EVE SHAPIRO, GENDER CIRCUITS: BODIES AND IDENTITIES IN A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 58 (2010) (dis-
cussing the meaning of “cisgender”).  Contrast this with the intersex: people whose biological sex puts 
them somewhere between the expected sexual categories of male and female. 
69  Intersex people usually express a gender that accords with their legally recognized sex.  What’s 
the Difference Between Being Transgender or Transsexual and Having an Intersex Condition?, 
INTERSEX SOC’Y N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/transgender (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) [hereinafter 
Difference]. 
70  See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
71  Semenya was the cover model for the popular South African glossy You and was featured wear-
ing makeup and traditionally feminine clothes and jewelry with the exclamation “Wow, Look at Caster 
Now!”  YOU, Sept. 10, 2009, at cover; see Oren Yaniv, Athlete Caster Semenya, Forced to Take Gender 
Test to Confirm Sex—Appears as Girly Mag Cover Model, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 9, 2009), 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-09-09/news/17933691_1.  The photo shoot was aimed at reinforc-
ing perceptions of Semenya’s femininity—and by association her femaleness—to a world audience, and 
it was met with mixed results.  See, e.g., Owen Slot, World in Motion: Caster Semenya Photoshoot 
Brings Sex Back to Top of Agenda, TIMES ONLINE (London) (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.timesonline.
co.uk/tol/sport/columnists/owen_slot/article6825732.ece (arguing that Semenya’s photo shoot distracts 
from the real issue of her supposedly scientifically verifiable sex).  
72  See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 65, at 116 n.3; Greenberg, supra note 40, at 267 n.6. 
73  See Mairi MacDonald, Intersex and Gender Identity, U.K. INTERSEX ASS’N, 
http://www.ukia.co.uk/voices/is_gi.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).  One primary difference is that inter-
sex people typically have normal gender expression.  Difference, supra note 69.  The conflict between 
transsexuals and the intersex is especially visible in the debate on the necessity of genital surgery.  See 
Ben-Asher, supra note 54, at 55–72. 
74  See, e.g., CATHERINE HARPER, INTERSEX 109–10 (2007) (describing as common the experience 
of a woman with complete androgen insensitivity who had her gonads surgically removed in infancy). 
75  See, e.g., id. at 111–12 (describing the same woman being “humiliated by memories of having 
been examined by medical students and a range of doctors” who misled her about her condition and the 
painful process of vaginal dilation that she underwent in hopes of being more sexually normal). 
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ing told the name or nature of the condition that sent them to operating 
rooms or rendered them infertile.76   
And mistreatment by medical professionals is not a thing of the past.  
There was a significant public outcry in 2010 after it was revealed that a 
pediatric urologist had been conducting tests of sexual sensation on con-
scious six-year-old girls with surgically reduced clitorises.77  In these tests, 
as their parents watched, he would use a “vibratory device” to stimulate 
their clitorises, labia, and the introitus of their vaginas, asking them ques-
tions about the sensations.78  Although some DSDs can cause serious health 
complications,79 many intersex people can lead healthy lives without inva-
sive medical intervention.80 
Many intersex people are subjected to surgeries in their infancy that at-
tempt to “normalize” their atypical genitalia.  This very fact is discomfort-
ing to many people,81 and intersex activists are universally arrayed against 
the practice.82  Some intersex children are placed on hormone regimens to 
prevent the onset of male puberty.83 
Intersex people also face some difficulties dealing with the legal sys-
tem.  Their foremost difficulty is the issue of informed consent to medical 
treatment: infants cannot consent to genital surgery, and parents may be 
pressured to consent on their behalf without a full understanding of the risks 
 
76  See INTERSEX SOC’Y N. AM., CLINICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF DISORDERS OF 
SEX DEVELOPMENT IN CHILDHOOD 34 (2006), available at http://www.dsdguidelines.org/files/
clinical.pdf; Nina Williams, The Imposition of Gender: Psychoanalytic Encounters with Genital Atypi-
cality, 19 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. 455, 460 (2002) (relating the case of an adult woman whose par-
ents and doctors had never told her the nature of her condition); see also, e.g., HARPER, supra note 74, at 
109–11 (describing how a twenty-six-year-old woman was lied to her entire life about the gonadectomy 
she received as an infant). 
77  Alice Dreger & Ellen K. Feder, Bad Vibrations, BIOETHICS F. (June 16, 2010), 
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=4730. 
78  Id. 
79  Congenital adrenal hyperplasia, for example, can lead to serious complications early in life and a 
greater risk of cancer in adulthood.  See Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, GOOGLE HEALTH, 
https://health.google.com/health/ref/Congenital+adrenal+hyperplasia (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
80  Only some intersex conditions require medical intervention.  For example, congenital adrenal 
hyperplasia can cause serious health complications.  See id. 
81  Alice Domurat Dreger, Intersex and Human Rights: The Long View, in ETHICS & INTERSEX 73, 
80 (Sharon E. Sytsma ed., 2006) (“But to treat a psycho-social challenge with irreversible surgery can-
not be seen as practicing reduction of risk of harm by any stretch of the imagination.  There’s a reason 
people cross their legs and wince when you tell them about infant genital cosmetic surgeries.  And 
there’s a reason they don’t have the same reaction when you talk about psychological services and so-
cial workers.”). 
82  Id. (“After more than 12 years of loud activism, after hundreds of investigations by national and 
international journalists, not a single person with intersex has come forward publicly to say she or he 
thinks her or his infant genital surgeries were a good idea.” (emphasis omitted)). 
83  Greenberg, supra note 40, at 287–88. 
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or benefits.84  Moreover, because tests of an infant’s sex can produce ambi-
guous results,85 there is reason to believe that the rate of mistaken sex as-
signment (e.g., assigning a female identity to a person who will grow up 
feeling she is a man) may be higher among the intersex.  The process re-
quired to change one’s legally recognized sex varies by state and can often 
be difficult or impossible.86 
Yet with an unknown number87 of intersex people living in the United 
States and facing daily the challenges of their atypical physicality, it seems 
both cruel and out of place that the law would provide no remedy to people 
discharged, denied promotion, or harassed because of their DSDs. 
II. GENDER NONCONFORMITY, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE INTERSEX 
There is a growing body of case law backing the proposition that dis-
crimination “because of . . . sex”88 includes discrimination against a person 
because she does not fit social expectations of appearance or behavior.89  
But many jurisdictions are unwilling to apply this reasoning to cases involv-
ing sexual minorities.  In section A, I discuss the early jurisprudence that 
excluded trans90 people from the protections of Title VII.  In section B, I 
move on to Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc.,91 which applied the same reasoning 
to exclude the intersex from the protections of Title VII.  Then, in section 
C, I discuss the shifts that occurred in gender discrimination law with the 
Supreme Court decisions in Price Waterhouse, which recognized a cause of 
action for gender-nonconformity discrimination,92 and Oncale, in which a 
 
84  The Colombian Constitutional Court, for example, has ruled that parental consent cannot be given 
for infant genital surgery unless parents consent in writing several times over a reasonable period of time 
after being given very detailed information on the condition and the nature of the surgery.  See Julie 
Greenberg, Legal Aspects of Gender Assignment, 13 ENDOCRINOLOGIST 277, 279 (2003). 
85  See supra Part I.A. 
86  See Alice Newlin, Should a Trip from Illinois to Tennessee Change a Woman into a Man?: Pro-
posal for a Uniform Interstate Sex Reassignment Recognition Act, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 461, 479–
83 (2008) (discussing the system of state regulation and the many, sometimes insurmountable legal bar-
riers to legal change of sex). 
87  Depending on what conditions are included in the count, the total figure may well be in the mil-
lions.  See Greenberg, supra note 40, at 267 n.7. 
88  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
89  See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding Title VII 
prohibits hostile-environment harassment for failure to conform to gendered behavioral stereotypes). 
90  I use the term “trans” to refer to the collective group of transgender and transsexual people—
those who feel their gender is at odds with their sex.  See Lynne Carroll et al., Counseling Transgen-
dered, Transsexual, and Gender-Variant Clients, 80 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 131, 139 (2002) (defining 
“trans” as “[a]n umbrella term that refers to cross-dressers, transgenderists, transsexuals and others who 
permanently or periodically dis-identify with the sex they were assigned at birth.  Trans is preferable to 
‘transgender’ to some in the community because it does not minimize the experiential specificities of 
transsexuals”). 
91  660 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
92  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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unanimous Court broadly construed the “because of . . . sex” language in 
Title VII.93  In section D, I explore how the law is changing for trans plain-
tiffs: the Sixth Circuit and other jurisdictions have either applied the Price 
Waterhouse cause of action to protect trans plaintiffs or have held that dis-
crimination based on trans identity is discrimination based on sex.  None-
theless, the trans exception is alive and kicking in several jurisdictions, and 
I delve into their post-Oncale94 jurisprudence on the issue in section E.  Fi-
nally, in section F, I discuss how courts continue to apply a categorical 
Goldilocks jurisprudence, forcing plaintiffs to exhibit “just right” gender 
nonconformity to receive protection. 
A. Early Jurisprudence and the Transsexual Exception 
The exclusion of trans people from employment discrimination protec-
tions under Title VII began long before Price Waterhouse.  The logic of this 
position is that transgender is a gender identity and that discrimination 
against transgender people is therefore based not on sex but on “gender 
identity.”95  Analogously, discrimination against transsexuals is discrimina-
tion based not on sex but on “change of sex.”  This lack of protection for 
sexual minorities parallels the courts’ rationale in rejecting claims of dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation.96  The courts’ fear was that the 
plaintiffs were attempting to bootstrap new protections into Title VII’s “be-
cause of . . . sex” language when the language by itself does not evince a 
congressional intent to offer those protections.97 
The first case in which the “bootstrapping” logic was employed to de-
ny relief to a transsexual plaintiff was the 1975 case of Grossman v. Ber-
nards Township Board of Education.98  Paula Grossman, formerly Paul 
 
93  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
94  Id. 
95  These two characteristics are sometimes juxtaposed as if sex were natural and immutable and 
gender identity were psychological and mutable.  This is not the case.  See supra notes 54–64 and ac-
companying text.  Even if they were, however, Title VII has never distinguished between mutable and 
immutable characteristics.  For example, religion is certainly a mutable characteristic, and religion has 
been protected under Title VII since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed.  See Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)–(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)–(a)(1) (2006)); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Religion is, of course, a 
forbidden criterion, even though a matter of individual choice.”). 
96  See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Harassment 
on the basis of sexual orientation has no place in our society.  Congress has not yet seen fit, however, to 
provide protection against such harassment.  Because the evidence produced by [plaintiff]—and, indeed, 
his very claim—indicated only that he was being harassed on the basis of his sexual orientation, rather 
than because of his sex, the District Court properly determined that there was no cause of action under 
Title VII.” (citations omitted)); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(holding that discrimination based on sexual orientation is not discrimination based on sex), overruled 
by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001). 
97  See, e.g., DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 330–31. 
98  No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975). 
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Grossman, was a teacher employed by the defendant and was fired after she 
underwent an unspecified sex reassignment surgery.99  The court concluded 
that any discrimination that occurred was not because of sex (i.e., the plain-
tiff’s status as a female) but rather “because of her change in sex from the 
male to the female gender.”100  The court justified its holding by relying on 
its intuition that the “plain meaning” of “sex” does not include trans identi-
ties: “In the absence of any legislative history indicating a congressional in-
tent to include transsexuals within the language of Title VII, the Court is 
reluctant to ascribe any import to the term ‘sex’ other than its plain mean-
ing.”101 
The Ninth Circuit followed the same line of reasoning in its 1977 opi-
nion in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.102  The court concluded that, in 
absence of clear congressional intent otherwise, Title VII’s prohibition on 
discrimination “because of . . . sex” should be interpreted according to the 
“traditional meaning” of “sex.”103  Relying on dictionaries, it found that this 
“traditional meaning” included only the “two divisions of organisms distin-
guished respectively as male or female.”104  It likewise found that the pur-
pose of Title VII was to place women on equal standing with men; 
protecting transsexuals was not a part of that goal.105  Under the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s reading in Holloway, Title VII only protects transsexuals if they can 
show that they were discriminated against because of their sex, separate 
from their transsexual status—a tall order indeed.106 
The Eighth Circuit also adopted a “plain meaning” reading of Title 
VII.  In Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., Audra Sommers, a transgender 
woman,107 alleged that her former employer had violated Title VII by termi-
nating her employment.108  The district court found that the definition of 
“sex” for purposes of Title VII was “anatomical classification,”109 and the 
 
99  Id. at *1. 
100  Id. at *4.  Note that here the court used the terms “sex” and “gender” interchangeably. 
101  Id.  Unfortunately, the court did not then specify what it thought the plain meaning of “because 
of . . . sex” was or cite to any authority defining or construing that plain meaning. 
102  566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). 
103  Id. at 662–63. 
104  Id. at 662 n.4, 663. 
105  Id. at 662. 
106  Id. 
107  667 F.2d 748, 748 n.2, 749 (8th Cir. 1982).  The court recognized Sommers as a transsexual.  Id. 
at 750.  Nonetheless, Sommers described herself as a “female with the anatomical body of a male” with-
out a clear plan or desire to undergo sex reassignment surgery.  Id. at 748 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  She may fit better in the more recently recognized category of transgender people because it 
was her gender expression and behavior that did not conform to social expectations, not the indicators of 
her biological sex, and because there is no indication that she was seeking surgery to alter her anatomy. 
108  Id. at 749. 
109  Id. 
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court of appeals felt that “sex” should be accorded its “plain meaning.”110  
The appellate court did not clarify what it thought the plain meaning of 
“sex” was, but it held that transsexuality was not within it.111 
The clearest statement of this narrow construction of sex in Title VII 
came in the Seventh Circuit’s 1984 decision in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 
Inc.112  The court held that Title VII does not forbid discrimination against 
transsexuals.113  The plaintiff began flying for Eastern Airlines in 1968 and 
went on to earn promotion to First Officer, serve as a flight instructor, and 
log over 8000 flight hours.114  From an early age, she felt like a female 
trapped in a male body, and she struggled with her sexual identity through-
out her career.115  She first sought psychiatric and medical attention in 1968 
while she was still in the Army, and eventually she began taking female 
hormones.116  She was diagnosed as a transsexual in 1979 and underwent 
sex reassignment surgery in 1980.117  After her surgery, she obtained a new 
birth certificate indicating that she was a female, and the FAA indicated that 
she was a female on her flight certification.118  In 1981, Eastern fired 
Ulane,119 citing possible safety concerns in stressful situations.120 
The Seventh Circuit noted the difficulty of nailing down a way to de-
fine “sex” as it struggled with the problem of how to define Ulane’s sex.121  
She referred to herself as female and had a female presentation and female 
external morphology (breasts and a vagina).122  Yet she did not have female 
internal morphology (ovaries and a uterus), nor did she fit a functional defi-
nition of the female sex because she was unable to bear children.123  Nor, for 
that matter, did she have the expected female karyotype.124  In the end, the 
court noted a scholarly debate about whether transsexuals who undergo ge-
 
110  Id. at 750. 
111  Id. 
112  742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
113  Id. at 1084. 
114  Id. at 1082–83. 
115  Id. at 1083. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. at 1082. 
120  Obituary, Karen Ulane, 48, Pilot; Who Had Sex Change, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1989, at D25, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/24/obituaries/karen-ulane-48-pilot-who-had-sex-change.
html. 
121  Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 n.6. 
122  Id. at 1082 n.2, 1083 & n.4. 
123  Id. at 1083 (“Ulane’s own physician explained, however, that the operation would not create a 
biological female in the sense that Ulane would ‘have a uterus and ovaries and be able to bear babies.’”). 
124  See id. 
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nital surgery are legally of the opposite sex after surgery, but it unhelpfully 
evaded the difficult question of how to define sex, Ulane’s or otherwise.125 
Instead, the Seventh Circuit elaborated on the so-called plain meaning 
of Title VII’s “because of . . . sex” language.126  The district court judge had 
found that “sex is not a cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes” and is at 
least in part psychological.127  Although the district court judge had little 
problem saying in dictum that homosexuality and transvestitism are plainly 
outside the scope of Title VII’s protections, it was “an altogether different 
question as to whether the matter of sexual identity is comprehended by the 
word, ‘sex.’”128 
The Seventh Circuit disagreed.129  Transsexuals are not protected by 
Title VII, it reasoned, because transsexuality was not within the “ordinary, 
common meaning” of sex.130  Despite the expert testimony in the record as 
to the difficulty of defining sex,131 the Seventh Circuit held that “[t]he 
phrase in Title VII prohibiting discrimination based on sex, in its plain 
meaning, implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women because 
they are women and against men because they are men.”132  The court dis-
pensed with the contention that a person’s sexual identity is part of her sex 
by calling Ulane’s identity as a woman a “sexual identity disorder,” not a 
legitimate sexual identity.133 
B. Title VII and the Intersex: Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc. 
Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc.134 is the only reported case of an employ-
ment discrimination charge brought by an intersex plaintiff.  The plaintiff, 
Wilma Wood, alleged that C.G. Studios had failed to promote her and had 
terminated her employment solely because it had discovered that, prior to 
her employment with the company, she had undergone genital reconstruc-
tive surgery because of an intersex condition.135  Judge O’Neill’s opinion 
indicates neither how the company discovered this fact nor the exact nature 
of Wood’s condition. 
 
125  See id. at 1083 n.6. 
126  Id. at 1085 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982)). 
127  Id. at 1084 (quoting Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1983)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
128  Id. at 1084 n.10 (quoting Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 823). 
129  Id. at 1084. 
130  See id. at 1085 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
131  See id. at 1083 n.6. 
132  Id. at 1085. 
133  See id. (“[A] prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous 
with a prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s sexual identity disorder or discontent 
with the sex into which they were born.” (emphasis added)). 
134  660 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
135  Id. at 176. 
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Wood filed suit under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 
(PHRA).136  Judge O’Neill held that discrimination “because of . . . sex” in 
the PHRA means discrimination against a woman because of her status as 
female or a man because of his status as male.137  The fact that Wood had 
undergone gender-corrective surgery was irrelevant because, as of 1987, all 
existing “Title VII cases [had] unanimously h[e]ld that Title VII does not 
extend to transsexuals nor to those undergoing sexual conversion surgery, 
and that the term ‘sex’ should be given its traditional meaning.”138 
Because there was no legislative history or case law on which to draw, 
Judge O’Neill’s reasoning turned on his interpretation of the word “sex” in 
the PHRA.139  Like the courts of many other states, Pennsylvania’s courts 
interpret its antidiscrimination legislation, the PHRA, in accord with the 
federal courts’ interpretations of Title VII.140  Thus, like the federal courts in 
Grossman,141 Holloway,142 Sommers,143 and Ulane,144 Judge O’Neill con-
strained himself to deciding Wood on the “plain meaning” of “sex” in the 
PHRA.  Judge O’Neill construed the plain meaning of the statute in terms 
reminiscent of the Seventh Circuit’s construction of Title VII in Ulane.145  
To the extent that Price Waterhouse146 and Oncale147 have opened new 
 
136  Id.  The PHRA is a Pennsylvania analogue to the Federal Civil Rights Act.  When Wood filed 
her claim, the statute read: 
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation . . .  
(a) For any employer, because of . . . sex . . . to refuse to hire or employ, or to bar or to discharge 
from employment such individual, or to otherwise discriminate against such individual with re-
spect to compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . . 
43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 955(a) (West 1986) (current version at 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 955(a) (West 2009)). 
137  Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 177 (“The plain meaning of the term ‘sex’, as it is used in the [PHRA], 
would encompass discrimination against women because of their status as females and discrimination 
against males because of their status as males.”). 
138  Id. at 178.  This statement of case law was true at the time, but other jurisdictions have since dis-
agreed.  See infra Part II.D. 
139  Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 177. 
140  Id. at 177–78 (“The Commonwealth Court recognizes Title VII cases as persuasive authority on 
the subject of sex discrimination due to the substantial similarity between Section 2000e-2(a)(1) of Title 
VII and Section 5(a) of the PHRA.” (citing Leechburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth, 339 A.2d 850, 
853 n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct., 1975))). 
141  Grossman v. Bernards Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 
1975). 
142  Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977). 
143  Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982). 
144  Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). 
145  See Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 177 (opining that the plain meaning of “sex” encompasses “discrimi-
nation against women because of their status as females and discrimination against males because of 
their status as males”); see also Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (opining that the plain meaning of “sex” im-
plies that it is unlawful to “discriminate against women because they are women and against men be-
cause they are men”).  Judge O’Neill did not cite directly to Ulane for this proposition, but he was 
certainly aware of that decision and cited to it later in his opinion.  See Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 178. 
146  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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doors for transsexuals to attack their exclusion from Title VII protections 
after Ulane, however, these cases have also undermined Judge O’Neill’s 
reasoning in Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc. for excluding the intersex from the 
protection of Title VII. 
C. The Evolution of the Law: Price Waterhouse and Oncale 
In 1987, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, which held that Title VII forbids employers from making 
employment decisions based on an employee’s failure to conform to gender 
stereotypes.148  The appellant was the well-known auditing and accountancy 
partnership, Price Waterhouse.149  The respondent, Ann Hopkins, had 
worked for Price Waterhouse in Washington, D.C., for five years when her 
office proposed her as a candidate for partnership.150  Hopkins was the sole 
woman among the eighty-eight candidates for partnership at Price Water-
house that year.151  Her candidacy was eventually put on “hold,” meaning 
that she was denied partnership but was still eligible for reconsideration the 
following year.152 
In the course of her consideration, Hopkins received written reviews 
from several partners.153  No one could dispute that Hopkins was more than 
qualified; the trial judge noted that “[n]one of the other partnership candi-
dates at Price Waterhouse that year had a comparable record in terms of 
successfully securing major contracts for the partnership.”154  She was “gen-
erally viewed as a highly competent project leader who worked long hours, 
pushed vigorously to meet deadlines and demanded much from the multi-
disciplinary staffs with which she worked.”155 
Yet many of Hopkins’s reviewers focused not on her performance but 
on her aggressive manner.156  And many did so in overtly gendered terms, 
suggesting that Hopkins was “macho,” that she was “overcompensat[ing] 
for being a woman,” that she needed to take “a course at charm school,” 
 
147  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
148  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e are beyond the day when an em-
ployer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated 
with their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, 
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting 
from sex stereotypes.’” (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 
(1978))). 
149  Id. at 232. 
150  Id. at 233. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. 
154  Id. at 234 (alteration in original) (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 
(D.D.C. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
155  Id. (quoting Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1112–13) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
156  Id. at 234–35. 
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that her use of foul language was unladylike, and so on.157  One partner 
made his expectations particularly clear when he suggested that, to make 
partner, Hopkins should “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, 
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewe-
lry.”158 
The Supreme Court agreed that Hopkins had been judged against an 
inappropriate standard.159  It noted that Hopkins was stuck in a catch-22 sit-
uation because the aggressive attitude that had cost her the promotion had 
been necessary for her success in the high-stakes world of Big Eight ac-
counting.160  Yet Hopkins was not passed over because she was a woman; 
she was passed over because she was not womanly.161  Price Waterhouse es-
tablished that employees can show that the discrimination against them was 
“because of . . . sex” if motivated by their failure to conform to gender ex-
pectations.162  The Court thus gave its approval to gender-nonconformity 
discrimination as a basis for Title VII claims.163 
Lower courts have applied the reasoning of Price Waterhouse to cases 
of gender-nonconformity discrimination beyond the narrow catch-22 read-
ing: high-powered women are not the only ones protected under the Court’s 
holding in Price Waterhouse.  In Doe v. City of Belleville, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that H. Doe, a teenage seasonal employee, had a cause of action 
under Title VII after his coworkers harassed him, touched him, and called 
him derogatory names.164  Unlike Hopkins, Doe did not owe success on the 
job to his gender nonconformity, but the Seventh Circuit nonetheless upheld 
the trial court’s finding that Doe had been harassed because of his failure to 
conform to gender expectations.  It also found that sexual harassment based 
 
157  Id. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
158  Id. (quoting Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1117) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
159  See id. at 235–37. 
160  Id. at 251 (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require 
this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggres-
sively and out of a job if they do not.”). 
161  See id. at 237. 
162  Id. 
163  This approval quietly settled a split that had grown between the circuits on the question of 
whether discrimination based on gender nonconformity was “based on . . . sex.”  Compare Fadhl v. City 
& Cnty. of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding the city liable to a female police of-
ficer when evaluations leading to her termination were based on nonconformity to gender stereotypes), 
and Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding the city liable for failing to 
hire a qualified female as a police officer based on sex stereotypes), with Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that a male job applicant who wore long hair and was refused a 
job for being too “effeminate” was not discriminated against because of sex). 
164  119 F.3d 563, 566–68 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998). 
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on a failure to conform to gender stereotypes is sex discrimination for pur-
poses of Title VII.165 
The Supreme Court cut another leg out from under the “plain meaning” 
rules of Ulane and its brethren166 a decade after Price Waterhouse167 with its 
decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.168  The plaintiff in 
Oncale was subjected to relentless sex-related taunting, harassment, and 
touching.169  One coworker threatened to rape him.170  He left his job and 
sued his employer, but both the district court and the Fifth Circuit found 
that harassment of a man by other men was not actionable “discrimination 
because of . . . sex” under Title VII.171 
Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court reversing the Fifth Cir-
cuit.172  The Court affirmed the principle that Title VII should be construed 
broadly173 because its language “evinces a congressional intent to strike at 
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employ-
ment.”174  Indeed, the Court noted, “statutory prohibitions often go beyond 
the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately 
the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legisla-
tors by which we are governed.”175 
The Court’s reasoning in Oncale reinforced the notion that the cause of 
action for gender-nonconformity discrimination was not limited to the facts 
of Price Waterhouse, and the circuit courts have followed suit.  In Nichols 
v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises,176 the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff 
had a cause of action under Title VII for hostile environment sex discrimi-
nation based on gender nonconformity when his coworkers had subjected 
him to a barrage of insults, name-calling, and vulgarity for failure to con-
form to gender expectations.177  The Ninth Circuit then affirmed that hold-
 
165  Belleville, 119 F.3d at 581 (“[A] man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is 
slight, his hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his masculinity in a way that does 
not meet his coworkers’ idea of how men are to appear and behave, is harassed ‘because of’ his sex.”). 
166  See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 
Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th 
Cir. 1977); Grossman v. Bernards Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 
1975); supra Part II.A. 
167  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228. 
168  523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
169  Id. at 77. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
172  Id. at 76, 82. 
173  See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). 
174  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
175  Id. at 79. 
176  256 F.3d 864 (2001). 
177  Id. at 870, 874–75. 
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ing en banc in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.178  In Rene, the plaintiff’s 
coworkers subjected him to sexual taunting and touching because of his 
gender-nonconforming appearance and behavior.179  The court reversed 
summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that a hostile environ-
ment involving sexual touching is “because of . . . sex.”180  In their concur-
rence, three judges pointed out that Rene’s allegations supported the same 
cause of action under a gender-nonconformity theory.181 
Thus, the courts do not require that the plaintiff be stuck in Ann 
Hopkins’s catch-22 to successfully state a case for discrimination based on 
gender nonconformity.  The plaintiffs in Belleville, Sanchez, and Rene had 
not enjoyed success because of their feminine mannerisms.  In fact, the op-
posite was true: each had suffered harassment at the hands of his coworkers.  
The lower courts agreed that Price Waterhouse182 established discrimination 
motivated by a plaintiff’s perceived gender nonconformity as discrimina-
tion “because of . . . sex” for the purposes of Title VII.183  The courts’ 
agreement gave new hope to the transgender and transsexual communi-
ties—hope that courts would use Title VII to shield them from employment 
discrimination.  Instead, jurisdictions have split over whether Title VII pro-
tects trans plaintiffs or not.  
D. New Protections for Trans Plaintiffs: Smith and Schroer 
Armed with the gender-nonconformity theory from Price Water-
house184 and the Court’s reasoning in Oncale,185 trans plaintiffs have had 
some success in winning employment protections within the Sixth Circuit.  
In Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth Circuit held that Title VII protects 
transsexuals under Price Waterhouse’s gender-nonconformity theory.186  
The plaintiff was a transsexual employed by the fire department of Salem, 
Ohio.187  After being informed that the city government was looking for a 
way to force him out of his job,188 he retained counsel.189  When the city 
 
178  305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
179  Id. at 1064. 
180  Id. at 1067–68. 
181  Id. at 1068 (Pregerson, Trott & Berzon, JJ., concurring). 
182  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
183  See also Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A] 
plaintiff may be able to prove that same-sex harassment was discrimination because of sex by presenting 
evidence that the harasser’s conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did not conform to the ste-
reotypes of his or her gender.”). 
184  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228. 
185  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
186  378 F.3d 566, 572, 575 (6th Cir. 2004). 
187  Id. at 568.  Although Smith identified as a woman, I defer to the court’s practice of referring to 
him using masculine pronouns. 
188  See id. at 569. 
189  Id. 
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subsequently suspended him, he filed suit in federal court, alleging sex dis-
crimination in violation of Title VII.190 
The court reasoned that if Title VII protects men who engage in stereo-
typically feminine behavior, as the Ninth Circuit held in Nichols and 
Rene,191 then Title VII also protected Smith.192  The court also reasoned that 
Smith’s transsexualism was no bar to recovery; neither Title VII nor the ra-
tionale of Price Waterhouse evinced an intent to exclude transsexuals from 
the statute’s prohibition against discrimination based on gender nonconfor-
mity.193  In Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit affirmed this opi-
nion, granting a Title VII cause of action to a transgender police officer who 
was considered for promotion to sergeant but was singled out for scrutiny 
during the probationary period and was ultimately denied the promotion.194 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has also 
protected transsexual persons albeit by relying on Oncale195 instead of Price 
Waterhouse.196  In Schroer v. Billington, the court held that discrimination 
against transsexuals is “based on . . . sex.”197  Diane Schroer, formerly Da-
vid Schroer, was a transsexual who was offered a job as a terrorism research 
analyst at the Library of Congress after twenty-five years in the Armed 
Forces.198  Schroer accepted the position, but her supervisor revoked the of-
fer after Schroer informed her that she would be beginning the job as a fe-
male.199  The court found that Schroer had indeed stated a valid claim under 
Title VII.200  It rejected the Price Waterhouse gender-nonconformity theory 
that the Smith court had relied on,201 saying that it made little sense as ap-
plied to trans people, who are trying to conform to the expectations of the 
gender they claim.202  Instead, revisiting the district court’s reasoning in 
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,203 the district court recognized that transsex-
ualism “stem[s] from real variations in . . . the different components of bio-
logical sexuality—chromosomal, gonadal, hormonal, and neurological.”204  
The court held that, given those many factors that determine sex, discrimi-
 
190  Id. 
191  See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text. 
192  Smith, 378 F.3d at 571–72, 574. 
193  Id. at 574–75. 
194  401 F.3d 729, 733–38 (6th Cir. 2005). 
195  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
196  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see supra Part II.C. 
197  424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 (D.D.C. 2006).  Schroer went on to win her case at trial.  See Schroer 
v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). 
198  Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 205–06. 
199  Id. at 206. 
200  Id. at 213. 
201  Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
202  See Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 209–11. 
203  581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev’d, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
204  Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212–13. 
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nation against transsexuals was discrimination based on sex for the purpos-
es of Title VII.205 
E. The Transsexual Exception After Price Waterhouse 
Despite the growing precedent in favor of protecting transsexual plain-
tiffs from anti-trans discrimination under Title VII, many of the jurisdic-
tions that have revisited the issue after Price Waterhouse have continued to 
find for defendants under the bootstrapping reasoning of Ulane.  In Dobre 
v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
dismissed the case of a transsexual alleging sex discrimination in violation 
of Title VII.206  A few months after she was hired, the plaintiff informed her 
supervisors at Amtrak that she would be undergoing hormone injections 
and begin presenting herself as a woman.207  Her supervisors did not ac-
commodate her transition, and her employment ended shortly thereafter.208  
The court did not address the Price Waterhouse gender-nonconformity 
theory but relied instead on nonbinding precedent to hold that sex should be 
given a narrow reading that excluded all claims by transsexuals alleging 
discrimination for any reason not generally applicable to members of their 
new sex.209  The court applied the same rationale to the language of the 
Pennsylvania Human Rights Act that prohibited discrimination based on 
sex.210 
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania is not the only court that still ex-
cludes trans people from Title VII.  In Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 
the Eastern District of Louisiana held that a man who was fired because he 
sometimes presented himself as a woman outside of work was not the vic-
tim of gender-nonconformity discrimination.211  The court reasoned that he 
was fired not for gender nonconformity but for adopting the persona of a 
member of the opposite sex, and he was therefore not protected under Title 
VII.212 
 
205  Id. 
206  850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
207  Id. at 285. 
208  Id. at 286 (noting that Dobre was required to dress as a male, was not permitted to use the wom-
en’s restroom, and was not referred to by her female name).  
209  Id. at 286–87 (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. 
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. 
Pa. 1987); Grossman v. Bernards Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 
1975)); see also supra Part II.A (discussing trans-exclusive readings of Title VII before Price Water-
house); supra Part II.B (discussing Wood’s intersex-exclusive reading of Title VII). 
210  Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 287–88.  
211  No. Civ. A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002). 
212  Id. at *5 (“Rather, the plaintiff disguised himself as a person of a different sex and presented 
himself as a female . . . .  The plaintiff was terminated because he is a man with a sexual or gender iden-
tity disorder who, in order to publicly disguise himself as a woman, wears women’s clothing, . . . pre-
tends to be a woman, and publicly identifies himself as a woman named ‘Donna.’”). 
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In the 2007 decision of Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, the Tenth 
Circuit avoided the question of whether transsexuals are protected from dis-
crimination based on gender nonconformity.213  It affirmed the decision of 
the court below, which had held that the gender-nonconformity theory was 
not available to transsexual plaintiffs: 
There is a huge difference between a woman who does not behave as femi-
ninely as her employer thinks she should, and a man who is attempting to 
change his sex and appearance to be a woman.  Such drastic action cannot be 
fairly characterized as a mere failure to conform to stereotypes.214 
Both the Tenth Circuit panel and the district court claimed that the Seventh 
Circuit’s rule in Ulane215—that discrimination based on transsexualism is 
not discrimination based on sex—was still good law.216  In so doing, they 
created a split between themselves and the Sixth Circuit.217 
F. Goldilocks Jurisprudence Lives On 
There is now a division in the law between the jurisdictions that protect 
transgender plaintiffs under Title VII and those that do not.  The jurisdic-
tions that do not protect transgender plaintiffs under Title VII divide the 
spectrum of gender conformity into three classes.  If the plaintiff in a case 
conforms too closely to gender norms, then that plaintiff has no evidence of 
sex discrimination under the Price Waterhouse theory.218  If a plaintiff fails 
to conform to society’s gendered expectations to such a degree that she 
identifies more with being a member of the other sex, then the cause of ac-
tion fails because the plaintiff has left the realm of “mere” nonconformity 
and entered a nebulous zone of “disguis[ing] [one]self as a person of a dif-
ferent sex.”219  The middle category in this Goldilocks test, a hard-to-define 
category of people who do not conform to gender stereotypes but who are 
not transgender, is the only one that is “just right” and thereby protected 
under Title VII from discrimination because of sex.220 
 
213  Etsitty II, 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007). 
214  Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth. (Etsitty I), No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610, at *5 (D. Utah 
June 24, 2005). 
215  Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). 
216  See Etsitty II, 502 F.3d at 1221; Etsitty I, 2005 WL 1505610, at *3–4. 
217  Compare Etsitty II, 502 F.3d at 1221, with Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737–38 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 624 (2005), and Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 571–75 (6th 
Cir. 2004). 
218  Although such a gender-conforming plaintiff may be able to prove sex discrimination under 
another legal theory, this analysis focuses solely on the Price Waterhouse theory, which is unavailable 
to a person whose gender conforms to society’s expectations. 
219  See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *5 (E.D. La. 
Sept. 16, 2002). 
220  Price Waterhouse rescued Ann Hopkins from being stuck between the Scylla of losing her pro-
motion and the Charybdis of losing the reason for her success.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 251 (1989).  It is no small irony that many jurisdictions have stuck plaintiffs between a rock and a 
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The three-category Goldilocks test contrasts with the simpler binary 
test of Smith v. City of Salem.221  The Sixth Circuit’s test in Smith is the 
same as the Supreme Court’s test in Price Waterhouse: Was the plaintiff 
subjected to discrimination because of a failure to live up to social expecta-
tions of appropriate gender expression?222  Under such a test, there is no 
hazy distinction to draw between gender nonconformity and minority gend-
er identity.  Yet in either kind of jurisdiction, a cause of action may exist for 
intersex plaintiffs on a theory of anatomical nonconformity. 
III. THE CASE FOR A NEW INTERSEX LAW: ANATOMICAL 
NONCONFORMITY 
Whether or not it was correct according to the law as it existed in 1987, 
the holding of Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc.223 should not be considered persu-
asive authority today.  The court found that a person discriminated against 
because she is intersex has not been discriminated against because of sex.224  
Wood’s “plain meaning” reading of “sex” in the statute excludes many 
people whose lives are already much burdened by the legal system,225 and it 
has been called into question by the Supreme Court’s opinions in Price Wa-
terhouse226 and Oncale.227  First, I discuss how the law has moved beyond 
the “plain meaning” rationale of Wood and conclude that Wood is no longer 
good law.  Then, by analogy to the Price Waterhouse cause of action for 
discrimination based on gender nonconformity, I argue for a cause of action 
under Title VII for discrimination based on anatomical nonconformity—
that is, the failure for a person’s anatomical sex to conform to societal ex-
pectations for their gender. 
The reasoning of Wood turns on the premise that a plain reading of the 
term discrimination “based on . . . sex” only includes discrimination against 
women because they are women and discrimination against men because 
 
hard place by requiring them to plead sufficient gender nonconformity without pleading too much—if 
plaintiffs overshoot in either direction, they have no case.  See generally Keith J. Hilzendeger, Walking 
Title VII’s Tightrope: Advice for Gay and Lesbian Title VII Plaintiffs, 13 LAW & SEXUALITY 705 (2004) 
(discussing Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). 
221  Smith, 378 F.3d 566. 
222  Id. at 574–75; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251; Barnes, 401 F.3d at 737 (citing Smith 
and finding a cause of action where plaintiff alleged discrimination based on “his failure to conform to 
sex stereotypes”). 
223  660 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
224  Id. at 178. 
225  See Megan Bell, Comment, Transsexuals and the Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1709, 1719–20 (2004) 
(describing legal challenges faced by those outside the normal sex–gender dichotomies in seeking gend-
er reassignment on their legal documentation). 
226  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228. 
227  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
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they are men.228  This reading is troublesome on its own, and it conflicts 
with the constructions used by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse and 
Oncale.  One problem with Wood’s “plain meaning” reading of “because 
of . . . sex” is that it turns partly on the question of what defines a man or a 
woman.  The decision in Wood implied that there are two and only two sex-
es, that these two classifications are distinct and immutable, and that Wilma 
Wood was a member of neither.229  One plain reading of this language is 
that a person’s protection under Title VII depends on her membership with-
in one (and only one) biological sex.  Yet ambiguity, conflict, and indeter-
minacy beset any biological definition of sex.230  If a person with ambiguous 
or incongruent sex attributes is subjected to discrimination because of her 
status as a woman, she could nonetheless fail the Wood test because she 
may not pass a threshold question: whether she is biologically a woman. 
The Wood court also supported its decision by reasoning that a “plain 
reading” of the statute should not include the untraditional and unusual 
without clear instructions from the legislature.231  This exception runs con-
trary to Title VII’s textual prohibition of all discrimination on the basis an 
individual’s sex and goes against the spirit of the Civil Rights Act, which 
exists to protect minorities from unfair discrimination.232  If the “untradi-
tional and unusual” exception were applied to Title VII’s other protections, 
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,”233 it would lead to absurd re-
sults.  If a plain reading of “race” were to exclude the “untraditional and 
unusual,” courts might have grounds to ignore discrimination against mul-
tiracial persons, for example.  Their racial status was untraditional and un-
usual when the Act was written in the 1960s234—interracial marriage was 
 
228  660 F. Supp. at 177 (explaining that “sex discrimination” for Title VII purposes means “discrim-
ination against women because of their status as females and discrimination against males because of 
their status as males”). 
229  See Greenberg, supra note 40, at 323–24. 
230  See supra Part I.A. 
231  660 F. Supp. at 178; cf. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Con-
gress has a right to deliberate on whether it wants such a broad sweeping of the untraditional and un-
usual within the term ‘sex’ as used in Title VII.” (emphasis added)). 
232  H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 18 (1963) (“In various regions of the country there is discrimination 
against some minority groups. . . .  [I]n the last decade it has become increasingly clear that progress has 
been too slow and that national legislation is required to meet a national need . . . evidenced, on the one 
hand, by a growing impatience by the victims of discrimination with its continuance and, on the other 
hand, by a growing recognition on the part of all of our people of the incompatibility of such discrimina-
tion with our ideals and the principles to which this country is dedicated.”). 
233  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)–(a)(1) (2006).  Notably, the court in Wood gave no reason why its “un-
traditional and unusual” exception should be limited to sex. 
234  The United States Census did not allow people to identify as multiracial until the 2000 census.  
See Solomon Moore, Census’ Multiracial Option Overturns Traditional Views, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 
2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/mar/05/news/mn-33659.  Even so, only about 2.4% of Ameri-
cans identified as multiracial in the 2000 census.  SOC. SCI. DATA ANALYSIS NETWORK, CENSUSSCOPE: 
MULTIRACIAL PROFILE (2001), http://www.censusscope.org/us/chart_multi.html. 
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still banned or criminalized (or both) in sixteen states.235  If a plain reading 
of “religion” excluded the “untraditional and unusual,” a court would have 
grounds to ignore employment discrimination against members of novel, 
small religious groups like Wicca, whose beliefs are certainly atypical 
enough to be “untraditional”236 and whose membership is small enough to 
make them “unusual.”237  Wood’s “untraditional and unusual” exception for 
Title VII’s protected classes excludes minorities too small to have political 
power and too atypical to easily garner majority support.  If a member of an 
oppressed minority is excepted from any protection because her minority is 
small, dispersed, and politically powerless,238 then the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 falls far short of the intentions of the Congress that passed it239 and of 
our collective aspiration for fair practices in employment. 
Another problem is that Wood’s “discrimination against women be-
cause of their status as females and . . . against males because of their status 
as males”240 language wrongly elevates classification as a particular sex 
above an individual’s particular sexual identity.  The current of the law now 
flows in another direction; after Oncale, appeals courts have held that it is 
sufficient that the basis of the discrimination is sexual.241  Under the reading 
of the court in Wood, a plaintiff only has a cause of action if the plaintiff is 
discriminated against because of membership in a sex.  In other words, a 
plaintiff only has a cause of action when she has been discriminated against 
because of a biological characteristic that marks membership in one of the 
two major sexes.  This line of reasoning is contradicted by Justice Bren-
nan’s opinion for the Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: 
 
235  The Civil Rights Act was passed three years before the Supreme Court struck down antimisce-
genation laws in Loving v. Virginia, invalidating the laws of the sixteen states that still criminalized in-
terracial marriages.  388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967). 
236  Wicca is a decentralized neopagan religion that worships the earth.  See generally Wicca: A 
Neopagan, Earth-Centered Religion, ONT. CONSULTANTS ON RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/witchcra.htm (last updated Sept. 17, 2011) (describing the tenets and 
characteristics of the Wiccan faith). 
237  As of 2001, there were only 134,000 self-described Wiccans living in the United States.  BARRY 
A. KOSMIN ET AL., GRADUATE CTR. OF THE CITY UNIV. OF N.Y., AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 13 (2001), available at http://www.gc.cuny.edu/CUNY_GC/media/CUNY-
Graduate-Center/PDF/ARIS/ARIS-PDF-version.pdf.  
238  See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation 
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
239  See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 18 (1963) (“[The Civil Rights Act] is designed as a step toward 
eradicating significant areas of discrimination on a nationwide basis.  It is general in application and na-
tional in scope.”). 
240  Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 176, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
241  See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 305 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding 
that the plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to have a Title VII cause of action for sexual harassment in al-
leging that he suffered physical touching and verbal abuse about his sexual orientation because the ha-
rassment was sexual). 
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[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by as-
suming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their 
group, for ‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals be-
cause of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of dispa-
rate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’242 
Discrimination on the basis of sex is viewed from the perspective of the in-
dividual.  Sex and gender are unique to each individual, and individuals of 
any sex express their individual gender in many different ways.  Under the 
plain text of Title VII, it is the individual’s sex, not the sex of a larger 
group, that the courts must seek to protect.243  Ann Hopkins was not the sub-
ject of discrimination because of the aspects of her sex or gender that she 
shared with the stereotypical woman but rather because of the aspects of her 
gender that were peculiar to her.244  Congress and the Court’s command that 
sex be considered on an individual basis undermines the “women because 
of their status as females” analysis in Wood.  A plaintiff need not have the 
relevant part of her individual “sex” in common with all or even most 
members of a traditional sex to qualify for protection under Title VII. 
One final flaw in Wood is that it presumes that, even if the legislature 
intended to cure one social ill, it did not also cure others.245  This is falla-
cious given the longstanding canon of construction that remedial statutes 
are to be broadly construed to effect their purposes.246  Wood’s reasoning re-
lies on a perceived intent of Congress that the term “sex” in Title VII 
should be narrowly construed.  But in Oncale, a unanimous Supreme Court 
expressly disapproved of narrowly construing the term “sex” in Title VII: 
[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the 
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. . . .  Our hold-
ing that [Title VII prohibits] sexual harassment must extend to sexual harass-
ment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.247 
 
242  490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (emphasis added) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 
435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
243  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (making it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin” (emphasis added)). 
244  See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256 (“It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping 
in a description of an aggressive female employee as requiring ‘a course at charm school.’”). 
245  See Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 177 (“There is no showing that the Act was intended to remedy dis-
crimination against individuals because they have undergone gender-corrective surgery.  In the absence 
of such a showing, I cannot conclude that . . . the term ‘sex’ as used in the Act [has] anything but its 
plain meaning.”). 
246  See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“[W]e are guided by the familiar ca-
non of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its pur-
poses.”). 
247  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998). 
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Although the Pennsylvania General Assembly may have been thinking 
about discrimination against women when it passed the PHRA, they 
enacted a law that also provides a remedy for discrimination against mem-
bers of another sex through the language they used in the statute. 
There is little one can divine of Congress’s intent behind adding “sex” 
to Title VII as a protected class.  The word “sex” was added by a floor 
amendment to the bill on the day before the vote.248  There was no debate, 
there were no hearings, and no member of Congress read a statement on the 
matter into the record.249  There is evidence that the amendment itself may 
even have been offered in an effort to make the bill less popular and scuttle 
its chances in the House of Representatives.250  In other words, the sponsors 
who added this language to the bill may have been more interested in peel-
ing off votes to kill the bill than in protecting anyone at all from discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex.  If the courts adhered to the intent of the authors of 
the language on sex, Title VII would protect no one at all from sex discrim-
ination.  This would be an unsatisfactory construction, to say the least.  Of 
course, legislative intent can be divined from many sources, but the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Oncale dispenses with such analysis in its current 
standard: Title VII’s protections should extend to prohibit all discrimination 
“reasonably comparable” to the principal evil that it textually prohibits.251  
Discrimination based on anatomical nonconformity is reasonably compara-
ble to discrimination based on gender stereotypes or based on sexual anat-
omy altogether.  Moreover, when courts cannot rely on legislative history to 
divine the purpose of a legislative provision, the canon that remedial sta-
tutes should be construed liberally252 should be their guide. 
The only evidence that courts have relied on to say that Congress in-
tended a narrow reading of “sex” has been that members of Congress have 
proposed several bills to amend Title VII to protect employees from dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation and that Congress has yet to pass 
one.253  Those failed bills do carry weight on the question of Congress’s lack 
 
248  110 CONG. REC. 1391, 2577–84 (1964) (debating the proposed amendment of Representative 
Smith of Virginia to insert “sex” into the bill and culminating in a vote of 168–133 in support of the 
bill). 
249  Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). 
250  Id.  For a more thorough historical discussion of the addition of “sex” to Title VII, see Jo Free-
man, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & 
INEQ. 163 (1991). 
251  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. 
252  See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“[W]e are guided by the familiar ca-
non of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its pur-
poses.”).  But cf. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086 (“Although the maxim that remedial statutes should be 
liberally construed is well recognized, that concept has reasonable bounds beyond which a court cannot 
go without transgressing the prerogatives of Congress.”). 
253  E.g., H.R. 427, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 1545, 97th Cong. (1982); H.R. 2074, 96th Cong. 
(1980); H.R. 451, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 166, 94th Cong. (1975); see Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (“Had 
Congress intended more [than narrow conceptions of sex], surely the legislative history would have at 
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of intent to protect sexual orientation.  Arguments from total congressional 
silence, however, should be taken with a grain of salt.254  Representative 
legislatures are far from the ideal constitutional mechanism for protecting 
civil rights because it can be difficult or impossible for small or dispersed 
minorities to attract a legislature’s attention.255  The courts, as the only gov-
ernment institution insulated from a prejudiced majority, have a moral and 
constitutional duty to protect the interests of diffuse and stigmatized minori-
ties, which have more trouble convincing the political branches to protect 
them than does a prejudiced majority.256  When faced with a silent Congress 
and a question of statutory interpretation, the courts should err on the side 
of the powerless by broadly construing statutes that benefit diffuse minori-
ties.257  If that broad interpretation fits the legislature’s intention, then the 
matter is settled.  If the popular or legislative majority truly intends a nar-
row reading, that majority will have a much easier time amending the sta-
tute than would a diffuse minority. 
In place of Wood’s narrow reading of “because of . . . sex,” a court 
faced with a case of employment discrimination against an intersex person 
should draw an analogy to the law on gender nonconformity.  Title VII does 
not distinguish between sex and gender.258  The factors that determine a per-
son’s sex for medical purposes are just as much a part of the meaning of sex 
 
least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homosexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals, and would no 
doubt have sparked an interesting debate.  There is not the slightest suggestion in the legislative record 
to support an all-encompassing interpretation.”).  But see Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 
212 (D.D.C. 2006) (“[Ulane’s] arguments, perhaps persuasive when written, have lost their power after 
twenty years of changing jurisprudence on the nature and importance vel non of legislative history.”). 
Members of Congress have continued to introduce such bills in each successive Congress.  E.g., 
H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 288, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 
214, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 217, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 311, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1858, 
105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 382, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 423, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 1430, 102d 
Cong. (1991); H.R. 655, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 709, 100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 230, 99th Cong. 
(1985).  This list is incomplete; multiple bills were introduced in most Congresses. 
254  See Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212 (“The silence of forty years is simply that—silence.”). 
255  See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 92–93 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that 
large legislative districts disadvantage the minorities within them); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
256  For an analysis of how the stigma on a minority can itself impede a minority’s ability to gain fa-
vorable results from the democratic process, see Shavar D. Jeffries, The Structural Inadequacy of Public 
Schools for Stigmatized Minorities: The Need for Institutional Remedies, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 
56–57 (2006), which discusses this effect in the context of racial minorities. 
257  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory 
for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 324 (1988) (“In whatever manner a court interprets a 
statute with concentrated benefits and costs, the losing side often may obtain legislative reconsideration 
of what the court has done.  This seems useful.  The possibility of legislative reconsideration is substan-
tially less, however, if the court’s interpretation hurts a diffuse group . . . .”). 
258  See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
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in Title VII as are the gender assumptions that go along with them.259  “Sex 
stereotypes” are about biological sex just as much as they are about gender.  
In the same way that Ann Hopkins was discriminated against because her 
gender expression was more masculine than the partners of Price Water-
house were comfortable with, Wilma Wood’s sexual anatomy was slightly 
more male than her employers at C.G. Studios expected. 
The courts can therefore protect intersex people without challenging 
the Goldilocks case law on gender nonconformity that exists in a number of 
jurisdictions.260  On a scale of anatomical conformity, the transgender, 
whose gender expression differs completely from their biological sex, are 
analogous to transsexuals under the gender-nonconformity case law.  A 
transgender person’s biological sex differs completely from the presump-
tions that follow from her gender expression.  A jurisdiction that holds that 
transsexuals are not covered by gender conformity case law because trans-
sexuals are so nonconforming that protecting them is a step too far would 
hold that a transgender person is too anatomically nonconforming to her 
gender.  Yet an intersex plaintiff’s biological sex markers put her squarely 
in the middle of the “just right” zone for protection—somewhat out of con-
formity with social expectations but not enough that he or she is trying to 
protect a right to act like or be the gender opposite to her sex.261 
The intersex form a stigmatized and dispersed group, and stigma and 
isolation harm their ability to win employment protections from Con-
gress.262  The current dearth of intersex discrimination cases may be less the 
result of the lack of need to protect them and more a powerful indication of 
the stigma attached to publicly acknowledging that one grew up with a 
DSD.  The Intersex Society of North America,263 other organizations,264 and 
 
259  See Franke, supra note 32, at 5 (“Ultimately, there is no principled way to distinguish sex from 
gender . . . .”). 
260  See supra Part II.F. 
261  I do not mean to say that the tripartite division is wise case law.  When dividing a spectrum into 
three distinct categories, the courts face twice the line-drawing problems, and plaintiffs are left in the 
awkward position of having to plead and argue the often contradictory positions that they are noncon-
forming yet not too nonconforming to be unprotected. 
262  Cf. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 92–93 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).  The intersex 
are not concentrated in any legislative district; their votes and influence are spread too thin to affect 
elections. 
263  The Intersex Society of North America saw the problems facing the intersex as a result of stigma 
and trauma, not their DSDs.  What Is ISNA’s Mission?, INTERSEX SOC’Y N. AM., 
http://www.isna.org/faq/isna/mission (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).  Despite some success, the organization 
shut its doors in 2008 due to a perception of bias that stifled its advocacy work.  Our Mission, INTERSEX 
SOC’Y N. AM., http://www.isna.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
264  Accord Alliance is an advocacy group that seeks to promulgate new treatment guidelines for 
children born with DSDs.  ACCORD ALLIANCE, http://www.accordalliance.org (last visited Oct. 2, 
2011).  Bodies Like Ours is an online support community that makes it possible for intersex people to 
come together and share their experiences.  Intersex Community Forums, BODIES LIKE OURS, 
http://www.bodieslikeours.org/forums (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).  The Intersex Initiative provides re-
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popular culture265 have raised public consciousness of the existence of the 
intersex and the challenges they face.  As the intersex loom larger in the 
public eye, it is likely, perhaps inevitable, that the intersex will become 
more open about their status and face possible discrimination or retaliation 
from biased employers.266  When another case of intersex discrimination 
comes before the courts, judges will be in a position to recognize Title VII’s 
protections for the intersex and forestall further mistreatment.  Because leg-
islatures are more beholden to concentrated interests than to the needs of 
diffuse, politically impotent minorities,267 it is better for courts to err on the 
side of protecting those minorities than to count on a rationally unrespon-
sive Congress to provide a remedy.  At the very least, judicial opinions 
holding that Title VII protects the intersex might cause Congress to debate 
and clarify the meaning of “sex,” benefiting the courts even outside the con-
text of intersex discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
The law on sex discrimination has changed dramatically since 1987.  
Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc. is the only case on the books dealing with sex 
discrimination against intersex people, but it was decided in the era before 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Systems.268  
Because of growing popular knowledge about intersex people and DSDs, 
thanks to news media coverage of stories like Caster Semenya’s269 and pop-
ular media like the novel Middlesex,270 the stigma associated with being in-
tersex is shrinking.  Once it becomes more socially acceptable to 
acknowledge these conditions to friends and acquaintances, harassment and 
adverse employment actions will inevitably follow.  The courts can expect 
more employment cases about intersex discrimination to come in the future, 
and when they arrive, the courts should recognize that people who do not 
conform to anatomical preconceptions of what makes a man or a woman are 
 
sources to activists trying to influence public perceptions.  INTERSEX INITIATIVE, 
http://www.intersexinitiative.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).  Advocates for Informed Choice is a non-
profit legal advocacy organization that seeks to protect and represent the interests of the intersex.  
ADVOCS. FOR INFORMED CHOICE, http://www.aiclegal.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
265  See, e.g., supra notes 7–16.  
266  See Intersex in Non-Discrimination Law: Why We Oppose the “Inclusion,” INTERSEX 
INITIATIVE (Sept. 6, 2004), http://www.intersexinitiative.org/law/nondiscrimination.html (“As more 
people ‘come out’ publicly as ‘intersex,’ there is a possibility that some of them will face discrimination 
for having that status.”). 
267  See Eskridge, supra note 257, at 287. 
268  Compare Wood v C.G. Studios, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 176, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1987), with Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (decided two years after Wood), and Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (decided ten years after Wood). 
269  See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text. 
270  EUGENIDES, supra note 7. 
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just as protected by Title VII from discrimination on that basis as are those 
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